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ABSTRACT
Forty years ago in Flast v. Cohen, the Supreme Court created, for the Establish-
ment Clause only, a dramatic exception to the bedrock principle barring general
taxpayer standing.  The Court’s new exception was based on one catchy phrase from
a famous historical document—James Madison’s 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments.  The Court has been notoriously bad at Establish-
ment Clause history, but Flast seemed to push the envelope.  Yet neither the Court
nor commentators have questioned Flast’s historical credentials over the last four
decades.  Recently, the Supreme Court took up the taxpayer standing question again
in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.  Unhappily, the Justices’ various
opinions did not clarify the matter, and only obliquely addressed the credibility of
Flast’s use of history.  This Article goes where the Court should have gone, and
scrutinizes the historical underpinnings of the Flast exception to generalized tax-
payer standing in Establishment Clause cases.  The Article concludes that Madison’s
Memorial offers little support for that doctrine. Flast lifted a political argument from
one context and applied it uncritically in a different context and to a different issue.
It confused what Madison thought about the substance of religious liberty in general,
with what he thought about how religious liberty should be posited and enforced in
particular legal provisions.  Most fundamentally, it failed to consider Madison’s
larger argument and objectives in the Memorial.  The Article concludes by placing
this failure of analysis in the broader context of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Hein may well presage the Court’s reconsideration of Flast’s taxpayer standing
exception.  That reconsideration would itself be part of a much needed refinement of
the Court’s treatment of historical materials in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
In Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court recently reconsidered whether taxpayers have standing to sue
the government for Establishment Clause violations.1  The Court’s strange doc-
trine in this area needed clarifying.  Forty years ago, in Flast v. Cohen, the
Court had created, for the Establishment Clause alone, an exception to the oth-
erwise “impenetrable barrier” against taxpayer standing.2 Flast grounded that
exception on a single historical document—James Madison’s 1785 Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.3  Indeed, the Court seemed
to rely not so much on the document itself, as on Madison’s memorable jere-
miad against “three pence . . . for the support of any one establishment.”4 Hein
gave the Court an opportunity to explain Flast, or to overrule it, but the Court
did neither.  Instead, a three-Justice plurality merely refused to extend Flast,
while showing evident distaste for the precedent.5
The precise legal question in Hein—whether to extend the Flast exception
from congressional spending to executive action—was not terribly interesting
in its own right.  That question depends on whether Flast itself was correct.
But the opinions in Hein offer precious little insight.  After four decades, the
question still seems to boil down to Madison’s “three pence.”  This Article
addresses that strange state of affairs.  Can a unique and important exception to
the taxpayer standing bar be justified by one line from a famous document?
Does the Court even need to engage in such special pleading for the Establish-
ment Clause?  Maybe the Clause supports taxpayer standing for reasons other
than Madison’s catchy turn-of-phrase?
Prompted by the Court’s failure to confront the issue squarely in Hein, this
Article reconsiders Flast’s own explanation for its taxpayer standing doctrine.
It proceeds as follows.  First, it briefly examines the development of that doc-
trine from Flast to Hein.  Second, it asks whether Flast can be justified by
analogy to other standing precedents, as Justice Souter argues in his Hein dis-
sent.6  Third, it asks whether Flast is supported, as the decision claimed, by
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance and his “three pence” argument.
Finally, if Flast is not persuasively supported by the Memorial, the Article
explores the implications for the Establishment Clause itself.
The Article concludes that Madison’s Memorial offers little support for
Flast’s doctrine of taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases. Flast
lifted a political argument from one context (a 1785 legislative proposal in
Virginia) and applied it uncritically in a different context and to a different
issue (the enforceability of a federal constitutional guarantee).  It confused what
1 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
2 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85, 105-06 (1968).
3 Id. at 103-04 & n.24. See also JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 82, 82-84
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter MEMORIAL].
4 MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 82.
5 Two Justices would have overruled Flast, while four would have reaffirmed it and
extended its doctrine. See infra Part I.
6 See, e.g., Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2563 (analogizing Flast standing to cases recognizing other
forms of intangible harms).
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Madison thought about the substance of religious liberty in general, with what
he thought about how religious liberty ought to be posited and enforced in
particular legal provisions.  Most fundamentally, it failed to consider the “three
pence” language in the context of Madison’s larger argument and objectives in
the Memorial.  The Article concludes by placing this failure of analysis in the
broader context of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Hein may well presage
the Court’s reconsideration of Flast’s taxpayer standing exception.  That recon-
sideration would itself be part of a more general and much needed refinement
of the Court’s treatment of historical materials in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
I. TAXPAYER STANDING:  FROM FLAST TO HEIN
Unlike certain European courts, federal courts in the United States cannot
offer advice about the constitutionality of government action.7  The Constitu-
tion itself insures this by vesting judicial power only over “cases” or “contro-
versies.”8  To enforce this limitation of judicial power, the Supreme Court has
elaborated the doctrine of standing.9  Central to standing is the idea of injury.
To show standing, and thus to present a genuine “case or controversy,” a plain-
tiff must prove some personal injury caused by the challenged government
action.10  But not all claimed injuries will suffice.  Injuries far removed from
traditional property or bodily damage, such as claims of symbolic or stigmatic
harm, usually fail to create standing.  This is the bar against “generalized griev-
ances,” which Professor Chemerinsky describes as arising in cases “where the
plaintiffs sue solely as citizens concerned with having the government follow
the law or as taxpayers interested in restraining allegedly illegal government
expenditures.”11  Thus, a citizen’s interest as a taxpayer in seeing tax dollars
legally spent cannot create standing.  The citizen may be correct that tax money
was spent improperly, but without a personal injury, his indignation must be
redressed by the political process rather than by federal adjudication.
On its face, this principle would foreclose a significant kind of Establish-
ment Clause challenge to state action.  Suppose someone claims that govern-
ment spending amounts to a “law respecting an Establishment of religion,” and
seeks to adjudicate that claim based on his status as taxpayer.  The rule against
general taxpayer standing bars the claim for two, interrelated reasons.  First, the
claimed injury is not sufficiently personal:  the challenged expenditure does not
uniquely harm this plaintiff compared to three hundred million other taxpay-
7 See generally NORMAN DORSEN, MICHAEL ROSENFELD, ANDR ´AS SAJ ´O & SUSANNE BAER,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 113-133 (2003) (discussing abstract vs. concrete models
of judicial review); MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COM-
PARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 88-121 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing different models of judicial
review in France, Germany and Italy).
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
9 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES & POLICIES § 2.5
(3d ed. 2006); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-14 to -16 (3d
ed. 2000).
10 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-16 (discussing “injury-in-fact” component of
standing).
11 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.5.5, at 91.
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ers.12  Second, the nature of the claimed injury eludes definition.  The plaintiff
is not claiming back taxes on the expenditures.  Nor does the plaintiff allege a
special kind of personal affront:  he does not claim, for instance, to have been
exposed to the government program and injured psychologically or stigmati-
cally.13  Instead, the plaintiff seeks redress for a dramatically attenuated kind of
symbolic injury.  Again, one might intuit that this amounts to some kind of
harm, but articulating the harm in traditional categories of injury is difficult.
Perhaps the injury lies in the knowledge that funds are spent in an illicitly
“religious” manner, perhaps in some prophetic dread of the consequences that
might flow from the transgression.  But, however described, those appear to be
precisely the kinds of injuries the standing doctrines were designed to weed
out.
In Flast, the Supreme Court abruptly changed that.14  The Court allowed
plaintiffs to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal educational
spending program, based “solely on their status as federal taxpayers.”15  To
relax the traditional bar against taxpayer standing, the Court would require
plaintiffs to show a two-part “nexus” between their federal taxpayer status and
the lawsuit.  Taxpayer status must be linked to the “type of legislative enact-
ment attacked,” as well as to “the precise nature of the constitutional infringe-
ment alleged.”16  The first part means that plaintiffs may attack an exercise of
Congress’ Article I power to tax and spend, but not “an incidental expenditure
of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute.”17  The
second part means that plaintiffs must allege the violation of a “specific consti-
tutional limitation[ ] imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and
spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the
power delegated to Congress by Art[icle] I, § 8.”18  The Court found both parts
met in Flast.  The plaintiffs were challenging a “substantial expenditure of fed-
eral tax funds” to state and local educational agencies.19  And, they claimed the
expenditures violated the Establishment Clause, which the Court said was
“designed as a specific bulwark against” improper government use of its taxing
and spending powers.20
The new doctrine seemed tailor-made for Establishment Clause chal-
lenges, because of the unique role the Court ascribed to that constitutional pro-
vision.  The Clause, argued that majority, grew out of the “specific evils
feared” by its drafters and supporters, namely that “the taxing and spending
power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in
general.”21  Concurring, Justice Stewart reasoned that, “[b]ecause that [C]lause
plainly prohibits taxing and spending in aid of religion, every taxpayer can
12 See, e.g., id. § 2.5.2, at 64; TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-16, at 400, § 3-17, at 421.
13 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.5.2, at 70; TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-16, at 400.
14 On the Flast exception to taxpayer standing, see generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9,
§ 2.5.5, at 92-95; TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-17, at 421-24.
15 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
16 Id. at 102.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 102-03.
19 Id. at 103.
20 Id. at 104.
21 Id. at 103.
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claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a relig-
ious institution.”22  Similarly, Justice Fortas was willing to subscribe to the
“thesis that this Clause includes a specific prohibition upon the use of the
power to tax to support an establishment of religion.”23
But the Court saw far more in the Establishment Clause than a mere limit
on Congress’ taxing and spending powers.  In the Clause, the Court discerned a
crucial defense against vast dangers—crucial enough to justify a pointed excep-
tion to the usual standing rules and, consequently, a massive expansion of
potential Establishment Clause plaintiffs.  Justifying the link between taxpayer
status and the Clause’s protections, Justice Fortas opined that
[i]n terms of the structure and basic philosophy of our constitutional government, it
would be difficult to point to any issue that has a more intimate, pervasive, and
fundamental impact upon the life of the taxpayer—and upon the life of all citizens.24
Justice Douglas went even further.  Deriding the idea that the taxpayer’s
interest was “infinitesimal,” Justice Douglas intimated that even minuscule
amounts of tax dollars could “signal a monstrous invasion by the Government
into church affairs, and so on.”25  The “mounting federal aid to sectarian
schools” was in his view “notorious[,] and the subterfuges numerous.”26  To
support his argument, Justice Douglas footnoted some remarkable passages
from a scholarly article:
Tuition grants to parents of students in church schools is [sic] considered by the
clerics and their helpers to have possibilities.  The idea here is that the parent receives
the money, carries it down to the school, and gives it to the priest.  Since the money
pauses a moment with the parent before going to the priest, it is argued that this
evades the constitutional prohibition against government money for religion!  This is
a diaphanous trick which seeks to do indirectly what may not be done directly.27
Justice Douglas likened such “tricks” to “the host of devices used by the
States to avoid opening to Negroes public facilities enjoyed by whites.”28
Thus, the Flast Justices cast the Establishment Clause as a specific, and
crucial, limitation on the federal taxing-and-spending power.  This was the
lynchpin for creating a unique exception to what the Court termed an otherwise
“impenetrable barrier” against generalized taxpayer standing.29  But what was
the historical evidence on which the Court based this understanding of the
Establishment Clause?  Remarkably, the Court relied on a single historical doc-
ument—Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments—a document that was, incidentally, not written in support of the
Establishment Clause.  Literally not one other piece of historical evidence was
cited.  But speaking here of “citing” or “relying” on a document does not, as
discussed below, do justice to the Court’s approach.  The Court and individual
22 Id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23 Id. at 115 (Fortas, J., concurring).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 108 (Douglas, J., concurring).
26 Id. at 113.
27 Id. at 113 n.9 (quoting Editorial, CHURCH & ST., June 1968, at 5).
28 Id. at 112-13.  On Justice Douglas’s views of Catholic education, and on his citation of
anti-Catholic writings in his judicial opinions, see generally JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLI-
CISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM:  A HISTORY 184-85, 264 (2003).
29 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 85, 105-06.
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Justices relied on just one phrase in the Memorial—Madison’s “three pence”
language—as the sole, rhetorical touchstone for their new doctrine.
Madison’s “three pence” argument figures in one of the most famous slip-
pery slope arguments in American legal history.30  Urging the 1785 Virginia
Legislature to reject Patrick Henry’s proposed tax for support of Christian min-
isters, Madison masterfully reasoned that the very smallness of the tax was
ominous.  “The free men of America,” rang out Madison, “did not wait till
usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise,” but instead “t[ook] alarm at
the first experiment on our liberties.”31  Madison’s vigilant countrymen “saw
all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by
denying the principle.”32  What consequences did Madison see, and wish to
avoid, in the Virginia ministry tax?
[T]hat the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other
Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in
exclusion of all other Sects[.]  [T]hat the same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever[.]33
Madison’s pamphlet was addressed to the Virginia Legislature, and his
position triumphed.34  Henry’s tax was defeated, and instead Thomas Jeffer-
son’s “Act for Establishing Religious Freedom” became law later that year.35
Jefferson’s Act contained language that seemed to vindicate Madison’s “three
pence” argument.  The Act’s preamble declared that “to compel a man to fur-
nish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbe-
lieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”36  It added that even “forcing him to support
this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion” amounted to “depriving
him of the comfortable liberty” of deciding which minister deserved his
patronage.37
Like an architect designing a home around a particularly beautiful view,
the Flast Justices built their new exception to taxpayer standing around
Madison’s “three pence” verbiage.  The majority quoted the language verbatim,
as its first step to explaining why the individual taxpayer could claim that “his
tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections against such abuses of legislative power.”38  Justice Douglas was
even plainer.  Observing that “Madison in denouncing state support of churches
said the principle was violated when even ‘three pence’ was appropriated to
30 On the historical background to MEMORIAL, see generally THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST
FREEDOMS:  CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
142-46 (1986); Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty:  Seven Questions
from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783-86 (2002).
31 MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 82.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See CURRY, supra note 30, at 146.
36 See ACT FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 84, 84-85 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter ACT
FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM].
37 Id. at 84.
38 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) .
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that cause by the Government,” Justice Douglas concluded that “[i]t therefore
does not do to talk about taxpayers’ interest as ‘infinitesimal.’”39  For Justice
Douglas, then, the case involved not the judicial oversight of political matters,
but instead judicial vindication “where wrongs to individuals are done by viola-
tion of specific guarantees.”40  Justices Stewart and Fortas joined the chorus,
referring explicitly to Madison’s “three pence” language, and to nothing else.41
Indeed, no Justice offered any support beyond this specific passage in the
Memorial for the proposition that the Establishment Clause created a specific
exception to Congress’s taxing authority that would justify a unique exception
to otherwise universal bar on taxpayer standing.
In dissent, Justice Harlan took particular exception to this aspect of the
Court’s methodology.  Making an observation that, today, sounds shocking,
Justice Harlan asserted that “the evidence seems clear that the First Amend-
ment was not intended simply to enact the terms of Madison’s [Memorial].”42
While denying neither the relevance of the document to Establishment Clause
interpretation, nor the possibility that forbidden establishments could be con-
structed from federal funds, Justice Harlan nonetheless rejected the majority’s
uncritical reliance on the Memorial as a means of distinguishing the Establish-
ment Clause for standing purposes:
I say simply that, given the ultimate obscurity of the Establishment Clause’s histori-
cal purposes, it is inappropriate for this Court to draw fundamental distinctions
among the several constitutional commands upon the supposed authority of isolated
dicta extracted from the clause’s complex history.43
Like Justice Douglas, Justice Harlan showed he too could drop cutting
footnotes.  Justice Harlan approvingly cited a Supreme Court Review article
arguing that “to treat [the Memorial]  as authoritatively incorporated in the First
Amendment is to take grotesque liberties with the simple legislative process,
and even more with the complex and diffuse process of ratification of an
Amendment by three-fourths of the states.”44
This, then, is the curious origin of Flast’s exception to taxpayer standing.
In the thirty-nine years between Flast and Hein, the Court did not really alter or
explain the doctrine.  Consistent with Flast’s letter, the Court did refuse to
extend the exception from congressional taxing-and-spending to a federal
agency’s transfer of property under Article IV.45  But the Court never ques-
tioned, nor further elaborated, Flast’s theoretical or historical underpinnings.
Madison’s “three pence” continued to be the only investment the Court had
ever made in the matter.  Thus, the time seemed ripe when the Court granted
certiorari in Hein to reconsider the scope of Flast.  The Hein plaintiffs brought
an Establishment Clause challenge to executive orders aimed at facilitating
39 Id. at 107-08 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 111.
41 Id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 115 & n.24 (Fortas, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 126 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 126 n.15 (quoting Ernest J. Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?—The School-
Prayer Cases, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 8 (1963)).
45 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1982).
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religious groups’ equal access to federal assistance.46  The orders were not
issued pursuant to any congressional legislation, and were funded by general
executive branch—not congressional—appropriations.47  The sole basis for
plaintiffs’ standing was their status as federal taxpayers.48  What emerges from
the Court’s Hein opinions, however, does not bring closure to the matter of
taxpayer standing.  The controlling opinion in Hein is neither a ringing
endorsement nor a complete repudiation of Flast.49
Justice Alito’s three-Justice plurality opinion (joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy) merely “decline[s] [plaintiffs’] invitation to
extend [Flast’s] holding to encompass discretionary Executive Branch expendi-
tures.”50  But the opinion holds Flast itself at arms’ length.  Justice Alito
repeatedly emphasizes Flast’s “narrowness,” and essentially confines it to its
facts—i.e., to Establishment Clause challenges to “a specific congressional
appropriation” disbursed “pursuant to [an express] congressional mandate.”51
The plaintiffs protested that such a distinction between congressional and exec-
utive action was arbitrary:  their “injury” arose from the expenditures them-
selves and were thus identical in either case.52  But in response, Justice Alito
simply points to Flast’s emphasis on Congress’ taxing-and-spending power,
and reminds plaintiffs that Flast was a “narrow” precedent that has never been
extended.53  He does say that extending Flast would “raise serious separation-
of-powers concerns,” but quickly adds that Flast itself “gave too little weight to
these concerns.”54  Justice Alito’s response to Justice Scalia’s sharp dissent is
especially curious.  Justice Scalia’s point, discussed below, is that Flast’s
implicit logic demands that Flast either be extended to executive branch spend-
ing or overruled.55  Justice Alito responds that Justice Scalia’s position “is
wrong,” but does not explain why.56  Instead, Justice Alito simply repeats that
Flast made such distinctions and has never been extended.57  His final rejoin-
der to Justice Scalia is that “[w]e need go no further to decide this case,” inti-
mating that perhaps he would go along with Justice Scalia in a case squarely
presenting Flast’s viability.58
Despite the controlling opinion, then, six Justices agree that the distinction
between congressional and executive appropriations makes little sense.  But
two of them (Justices Scalia and Thomas) would overrule Flast outright, while
46 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2560 (2007).
47 Id. at 2559.
48 Id. at 2561.
49 For another recent discussion of Hein, see Douglas W. Kmiec, Standing Still—Did the
Roberts Court Narrow, But Not Overrule, Flast To Allow Time To Re-Think Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 511-13 (2008).
50 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568.
51 See, e.g., id. at 2565.  By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, while joining Justice
Alito’s opinion “in full,” says explicitly that “Flast is correct and should not be called into
question.” Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 2568 (plurality opinion).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 2569.
55 See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
56 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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four (Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer) would reaffirm and extend
Flast.59  Justice Scalia’s concurrence is the most explicit in attacking Flast’s
credentials.  First, Justice Scalia argues that Flast’s taxpayer standing exception
for Establishment Clause cases conflicts with the Court’s consistent denial of
such standing in all other cases.60  Fundamentally, the injury implicitly recog-
nized as the basis for Flast standing—what Justice Scalia derisively calls
“Psychic Injury” at seeing tax money illegally spent—is precisely the kind of
injury the Court had denied as a basis for standing elsewhere.61  Second, Jus-
tice Scalia rejects as irrelevant to the standing question “whether the Establish-
ment Clause was originally conceived of as a specific limitation on the taxing
and spending power.”62  Confronting Flast’s reliance on Madison’s Memorial
head-on, Justice Scalia argues that the document “has nothing whatever to say”
about whether taxpayer-based grievances confer federal standing under the
Establishment Clause.63  In his dissent, Justice Souter disagrees with Justice
Scalia on both points.  First, Justice Souter reads Madison’s Memorial as evi-
dence that “the importance of [taxpayer] injury has deep historical roots,” and
that the injury is linked to rights of conscience far deeper than mere “disagree-
ment with the policy supported.”64  Second, Justice Souter argues that the
injury recognized in Flast finds analogous support in precedents recognizing
standing for injuries such as “esthetic harms,” “inability to compete,” and “liv-
ing in a racially gerrymandered electoral district.”65  Justice Souter also recruits
Madison for this final point, observing that “[t]he judgment of sufficient injury
takes account of the Madisonian relationship of tax money and conscience
. . . .”
66
So runs Hein, a doubly disappointing performance by the Court.  At the
level of precedent, the Court has reaffirmed Flast, but by damning it with faint
praise.  Two Justices, Alito and Roberts, think Flast is worth saving for now,
but imply that it is badly flawed.  Oddly, Justice Kennedy joined their opinion,
but wrote separately that Flast is correct and should not be overruled.67  Two
Justices, Scalia and Thomas, think Flast is badly wrong and should be over-
ruled immediately.  Four Justices—Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer—
think Flast is doctrinally sound and should be extended beyond its holding.
Such is the precedential mess.  Furthermore, at the level of doctrine, we have
no majority explaining Flast’s underpinnings.  The plurality glosses over them.
Justice Scalia’s concurrence repudiates them.  The dissent merely recapitulates
what little Flast said about them forty years ago.
This is not pretty jurisprudence, but perhaps no one should be surprised
that the confluence of standing and the Establishment Clause has generated a
perfect storm of incoherence.  Six Justices do recognize, albeit from opposite
59 Compare id. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring), with id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 2574 (Scalia, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 2573-2584.
62 Id. at 2583.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 2585 (Souter, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 2587.
66 Id. at 2587-89.
67 Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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perches, that the path to greater clarity lies, not in anything the controlling
opinion said about Flast, but in Flast’s own credibility.  The remainder of this
Article attempts to assess that.
II. FLAST AND STANDING PRECEDENTS
Flast recognized that a distinct kind of injury in Establishment Clause
claims would confer standing.  This injury lies precisely in the improper
“extraction” and “spending” of tax dollars.68  The most straightforward way to
validate Flast is to analogize this injury to other injuries the Court has accepted
for standing purposes, while at the same time explaining why such an injury
does not fall under the general ban on taxpayer standing.  This would be a
better course than Flast itself took, because it avoids the burden of special
pleading for the Establishment Clause.  The Court would not have to theorize
about why the Establishment Clause is a “special” part of the Bill of Rights that
demands the recognition of a basis for standing denied in every other area of
constitutional law.
Perhaps this validation is impossible, which is why the Court felt impelled
toward such special pleading in Flast.  But the possibility is worth exploring
because the major weakness in Flast appears to be its thin reasoning about why
the Establishment Clause deserves a special standing doctrine.  Justice Souter
senses this problem, for in his dissent he includes a separate section explaining
why Flast standing is not as unusual as it appears.  “[I]t would be a mistake,”
Justice Souter argues, “to think [Flast] is unique in recognizing standing in a
plaintiff without injury to flesh or purse.”69  He analogizes the Flast injury to
cases where plaintiffs were allowed to complain about “esthetic harms,” or
about the harm of being forced to compete on a racially-biased playing field.70
Is this the way to justify Flast?  Is it as simple as saying, as Justice Souter does,
that “seeing one’s tax dollars spent on religion” is just as “concrete” as injury
as in these other cases?71
Justice Souter’s focus on “esthetic” or “stigmatizing” harms appears to be
the most promising avenue.  By definition, the standing-conferring injury in a
Flast case cannot lie in the economic effect of the tax on the plaintiff’s pocket-
book, because the injury would then be indistinguishable from any other com-
plaint about improper taxation.  Nor is plaintiff alleging that he was personally
affected in a distinctive way by the spending of the tax funds (otherwise, no
reason would exist for claiming standing on the basis of being a taxpayer).
Thus, the precise injury must lie in the realm of the plaintiff’s perception of the
constitutional imbalance created by the improper taxing-and-spending.  Perhaps
here is where one might search for the link between the injury and the tax-
payer’s “conscience.”  That is, if the locus of the injury is perceptive, then
involvement of the taxpayer’s conscience is at least prima facie plausible.  Of
68 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (stating a taxpayer has standing based on the
allegation that “his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitu-
tional protections against such abuses of legislative power”).
69 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2587 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70 Id.
71 Id.
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course, one would still need to explain why the injury to “conscience” is cogni-
zable only in this area and not elsewhere (such as conscientious scruples about
tax money being spent on what one perceives to be an unjust war, or what one
perceives to be the killing of unborn human beings).  But Justice Souter clearly
sees a constitutionally-distinct impact on conscience in this area, because he
connects the “Madisonian relationship of tax money and conscience” to the
modern-day endorsement test.  In Justice Souter’s view, the spending of tax
money for religious purposes gives rise to the perceptive or stigmatizing harm
by “send[ing] the . . . message to . . . nonadherents ‘that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community.’”72
Is this kind of perceptive or stigmatizing harm sufficient to confer stand-
ing under existing precedent?  Note that we are not yet asking whether the
Establishment Clause supports, as a doctrinal or historical matter, the recogni-
tion of such a special harm; we are merely asking whether this sort of percep-
tive harm is analogous to injuries in other cases.  Justice Souter cites Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, in which the Court found
standing where “a company’s continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of
pollutants into a river would cause nearby residents to curtail their recreational
use of that waterway and would subject them to other economic and aesthetic
harms.”73  The “aesthetic” or “perceptive” harms consisted in plaintiffs’ avoid-
ance of the affected areas either because of their fear of physical harm or
because they perceived the area actually “looked and smelled polluted.”74
Another case cited by Justice Souter, United States v. Hays, presents a different
kind of “perceptive” harm caused by racial classification.75  If a person is sub-
ject to classification on the basis of race, then the stigmatic harm caused by the
classification itself is sufficient to confer standing.  More specifically, if a per-
son resides in a racially gerrymandered electoral district (the issue in Hays),
then she suffers a concrete “representational harm” tied to the fact that “the
plaintiff has been denied equal treatment.”76  This harm would not, however,
extend to a person not included in the gerrymandered district.77
The harms recognized in cases such as Friends of Earth and Hays are
perceptive or aesthetic in the sense that the injuries manifest themselves to the
plaintiffs primarily through their own perceptions, instead of through economic
72 Id. at 2588 (quoting McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S.
844, 860 (2005)).
73 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000).
74 Id. at 181.
75 United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744 (1995).
76 Id. at 745.  As the Court explained in Hays, “[w]hen a district obviously is created solely
to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more
likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group,
rather than their constituency as a whole.” Id. at 744 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
648 (1993)).
77 See id. at 745:
On the other hand, where a plaintiff does not live in such a district, he or she does not suffer
those special harms, and any inference that the plaintiff has personally been subjected to a racial
classification would not be justified absent specific evidence tending to support that inference.
Unless such evidence is present, that plaintiff would be asserting only a generalized grievance
against governmental conduct of which he or she does not approve.
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or physical impact.  Those decisions thus extend our thinking about cognizable
injuries.  As Professor Tribe explains, the interests vindicated in such cases
“need only be expressible in terms of the individual’s concrete satisfactions or
experiences . . . .”78  But these are not “generalized grievance” situations,
because the plaintiffs are differently situated from other persons:  only because
of personal circumstances (living near a polluted river, or residing in a gerry-
mandered district) are they actually subject to such perceptive or stigmatic
harms.  Professor Tribe clarifies that such cases recognize standing for aesthetic
or recreational harms “only if such injury represents an individuated interest of
the litigant as distinguished from the polity as a whole.”79  Thus the harms do
not lie purely in the plaintiffs’ perceptions.  Rather, through their perceptions,
the plaintiffs become aware of concrete harms (the polluted river, the gerry-
mandered district) outside themselves.
One might construct an analogy, as Justice Souter does, between such
harms and those at issue in Flast and Hein, but the analogy cannot go far
enough.  True, Flast and Hein present plaintiffs who have been made aware of
allegedly illegal activity (the expenditure of money for religious purposes) and
are thereby wounded.  They claim harm to conscience through their percep-
tions.  One could analogize that to the perception of a polluted river, or to the
perceived unfairness of a racial gerrymander.  But Flast and Hein contain an
additional, crucial component.  The perceptive harms in those cases are medi-
ated to plaintiffs solely through the tax system.  The plaintiffs are not com-
plaining about their own personal exposure to an illegally-funded government
religious program.  Rather, they are complaining about their exposure to a tax
system that collects and spends money in an allegedly unconstitutional endorse-
ment of religion.  This factor decisively distinguishes the “perceptive/stigmatic/
esthetic” harms claimed in Flast and Hein from those already validated by the
Court elsewhere.
The Court’s decision in Allen v. Wright makes this difference plain.80
There, the plaintiffs claimed standing based on the stigma caused them by an
IRS policy of providing tax exemptions to private schools that discriminated by
race.81  But the Court disagreed.  “[Stigmatic injury],” explained the Court,
accords a basis for standing only to ‘those persons who are personally denied equal
treatment’ . . .
. . . .
If the abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable, standing would extend nationwide to
all members of the particular racial groups against which the Government was
alleged to be discriminating by its grant of a tax exemption to a racially discrimina-
tory school . . . .82
This point was implicit in the other stigmatic harm cases.  The plaintiffs in
Friends of the Earth, for instance, would not have had standing based purely
on their perception of environmental harm, had they not also lived near the
polluted waters or desired to use them.  The plaintiffs in Hays would have
78 TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-16, at 404.
79 Id.
80 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
81 Id. at 739-40.
82 Id. at 755-56. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.5.2, at 74 (discussing Allen).
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lacked standing if they had not been included physically within the gerry-
mandered district.
Justice Souter’s Hein dissent obliquely concedes this point.  At the close
of his attempted analogy between the perceptive harm cases and Flast, Justice
Souter drops a revealing footnote.  Observing that not “any sort of [ ]injury will
satisfy Article III” and that the requisite “intangible harms must be evaluated
on a case by case basis,” Justice Souter admits that there is an entire class of
injuries, which typically never confer standing :
Outside the Establishment Clause context, as the plurality points out, we have not
found the injury to a taxpayer when funds are improperly expended to suffice for
standing.”83
But that is precisely why Justice Souter’s analogy does not work.  Only in
Establishment Clause cases have the required perceptive or esthetic harms been
premised on the general operation of the tax system.  The plaintiffs asserting
such a unique basis for standing are not saying they have been personally
exposed to a religious program that was improperly funded by the government.
That would at least be analogous to the polluted river and the racially gerry-
mandered district.  Instead, they claim harm from perceiving that the tax system
is being used to fund activities they believe improperly endorse religion.  But
no perceptive harm case recognizes that perception as sufficient to confer
standing.
Justice Souter’s analogical argument fails, in sum, because it completely
discounts the function of the tax system in the claimed injury.  The Supreme
Court has been willing to recognize perceptive harm for standing, even if the
harm perceived emerges from a lengthy and attenuated chain of circumstances.
For instance, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures (SCRAP), the Court allowed a student environmental group standing to
complain of aesthetic harms stemming from environmental degradation.84  The
degradation, the plaintiffs alleged, was the end result of a chain of causation
starting with a hike in railroad freight rates that would supposedly discourage
the use of recycled goods.  While admitting this was an “attenuated line of
causation,” the Court found standing because the plaintiffs credibly alleged that
“that the specific and allegedly illegal action of the Commission would directly
harm them in their use of the natural resources of the Washington Metropolitan
Area.”85  The important point about SCRAP is that, notwithstanding the some-
what fanciful chain-of-circumstances argument, the Court took pains “to stress
the importance of demonstrating that the party seeking review be himself
among the injured . . . .”86  But in the Establishment Clause taxpayer case, the
only way the “party seeking review” can claim to be “among the injured” is to
recruit the tax system as the instrument of his injury.  This, however, is exactly
the posture that the standing cases reject by requiring “personal injury.”  As
Professor Chemerinsky explains, cases like SCRAP “establish that an ideologi-
83 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2587 n.4 (2007) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
84 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669, 686-87 (1973).
85 Id. at 687-88.
86 Id at 687.
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cal interest in a matter is not enough for standing.”87  But the intrusion of the
tax system into the argument obliterates the distinction between cases, like
SCRAP, where there is a real, albeit highly attenuated injury, and cases where
plaintiffs merely have an ideological interest.
The exercise done in this Section has been to abstract the kind of injury
allegedly suffered in taxpayer Establishment Clause cases, and compare it to
other injuries the Court has accepted for standing purposes.  But doing that
reveals that Flast is not justifiable by analogy to those cases.  The perceptive or
aesthetic harms felt, via the tax system, from Establishment Clause violations
may be genuine, but other areas of standing doctrine require a more directly-
mediated form of personal injury to justify standing.  This exercise has been an
elaborate, but instructive, way of showing that there is nothing about such
Establishment Clause claims, in the abstract, that escapes the general bar
against taxpayer standing.  Consequently, if taxpayer standing is to be justified,
there must be something peculiar to the Establishment Clause itself that
demands a departure from the general rule against taxpayer standing.
III. FLAST AND MADISON’S THREE PENCE
Flast’s unique doctrine was based entirely on Madison’s argument in the
Memorial and Remonstrance that “the same authority that can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatso-
ever[.]”88  Of the Flast Justices, only Justice Harlan disputed this line of rea-
soning.  While granting that the Memorial could shed light on the nature of the
Establishment Clause, Justice Harlan denied that Madison’s 1785 arguments in
Virginia simply mapped onto the later federal constitutional provision.89  Nor
did he believe that, based on such evidence, the Court could distinguish among
different constitutional provisions based on whether they limited Congress’ tax-
ing-and-spending powers.90  Nothing, Harlan reasoned, marked out the Estab-
lishment Clause as a limitation more “specific” to taxing-and-spending than
any other provision.91  Virtually every constitutional limitation on Congress
operated to limit its taxing and spending authority, given that “Congress’ pow-
ers to spend are coterminous with the purposes for which, and methods by
which, it may act . . . .”92  This debate among the Flast Justices is the last time
the Court has squarely confronted the matter.
Thus, four decades later, the question still begs for an answer:  Does
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance demonstrate, of its own force, that the
Establishment Clause deserves a unique standing doctrine, sufficient to over-
come the bar against taxpayer standing in every other area?  Testing Flast’s
reliance on the Memorial is a delicate matter, however, because it risks wander-
87 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.5.2, at 65.
88 Memorial, supra note 3, at 82. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
89 See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
90 See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
91 See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
92 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 127 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 16-
27 and accompanying text.
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ing into the murky question of Madison’s precise relevance to the meaning of
the Establishment Clause.93  The Supreme Court has generally treated Madison
as a touchstone for what the Clause means, perhaps no more so than in this
area.94  Even where the Court has not followed Madison’s hypothetical lead on
a particular issue, dissenting Justices often recruit Madison to refute their col-
leagues.95  A vigorous scholarly debate persists about the nature of Madison’s
influence on the religion clauses.96  And Madison’s views were protean,
depending on whether he was occupying the role of Virginia legislator, consti-
tutional advocate, First Amendment draftsman, President, or former Presi-
dent.97  One can easily pit statements of these various Madisons against each
other, effectively obscuring what Madison “really thought” about the clauses.98
Madison, of course, did have historically verifiable views about what the relig-
ion clauses meant.  But the variety of historical evidence cautions one about
recruiting particular quotes or arguments from Madison as expressing his
thoughts about the clauses.
This Article need not resolve those difficult questions, because they would
simply overwhelm the distinct argument about standing.  Quite frankly, if the
question of taxpayer standing and the Establishment Clause hinges on correctly
appraising Madison’s relevance to the meaning of the religion clauses, then the
question will never be answered.  Establishment Clause standing doctrine
would fluctuate according to differing opinions about Madison’s significance to
religion clause meaning.  But surely one cannot be satisfied with that answer.
One should be able to accept that certain of Madison’s opinions are relevant to
what the Establishment Clause substantively means, but perhaps not relevant
(or relevant in a different way) to the question of which parties and what inter-
ests support adjudication of an Establishment Clause matter.  Standing ques-
tions can overlap to some extent with merits questions, but the two are
93 See, e.g., Vincent Phillip Mun˜oz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and
the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 592-600 (2006) (discussing
varying interpretations of Madison’s relevance to Establishment Clause interpretation).
94 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1947).  Richard Albert observes
that, in Everson, “[t]he Court’s review of Jeffersonian and Madisonian thought . . . com[es]
astonishingly close to declaring that the Court should rule in a particular way only because
Jefferson and Madison would have done so.”  Richard Albert, Beyond the Conventional
Establishment Clause Narrative, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 329, 338 (2004).
95 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 724-29 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96 Compare GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 86-87
(1987) (arguing that “Madison’s personal philosophy, whatever it may have been, has noth-
ing to do with the meaning of the Establishment Clause”), and 2 JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE
SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE:  FROM “HIGHER LAW” TO “SECTARIAN
SCRUPLES” 22-30 (2004) (characterizing Madison’s and Jefferson’s views on church-state
relations as novel for their time and hence not “command[ing] a consensus in their own
day”), with CURRY, supra note 30, at 193-222 (treating Madison’s views and influence as
deeply influential on the content of the Establishment Clause), and Noah Feldman, The
Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 390-93 (2002)
(same).
97 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS:  WHAT MADE THE FOUN-
DERS DIFFERENT 151-72 (2006) (discussing problem of Madison’s different personae).
98 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY:  A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 10-26 (2001) (discussing the tension between egalitarian
and pluralist views in Madison’s writings).
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nonetheless distinct.99  The doctrine of standing delimits the kinds of interests
plaintiffs can pursue in federal court, while at the same time furthering other
values such as separation of powers, judicial efficiency and effectiveness, and
fairness.100  Standing is not simply a stand-in for the merits question.  Other-
wise, the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III is superfluous.
Thus, the question is not whether Madison’s opinions can help one under-
stand the object and content of the Establishment Clause.  Instead, the precise
question is whether Madison’s “three pence” argument in his Memorial sup-
ports the recognition of a unique form of taxpayer standing in Establishment
Clause cases.  That question will intrude somewhat on how Madison’s opinions
bear on Establishment Clause meaning, but they are nonetheless two distinct
questions.  Madison had definite and well-known ideas about the large subject
of religious liberty, but he may well have entertained very different views about
whether those ideas were embodied in judicially enforceable legislation or con-
stitutional provisions.  More specifically, Madison may have thought a strategy
appropriate for Virginia legislative contests would have been highly inappropri-
ate, and politically inopportune, during the framing and ratification of a federal
constitution.  These different threads must be teased out if one is to arrive even
at a tentative conclusion about the relevance of Madison’s “three pence” argu-
ment to standing.  The Flast court, incidentally, did none of this work.  It sim-
ply compacted all such questions into this syllogism:
1. Madison is the father of the Establishment Clause;
2. Madison said taxpayers should not be taxed even three pence for an
establishment;
3. Therefore, every taxpayer has standing to sue for Establishment
Clause violations.101
Let us try to do better than that.  We will start by making a few brief
points to set the general context of Madison’s Memorial and his arguments
against the General Assessment.  Doing so reveals the obvious point that
Madison’s “three pence” rhetoric arose during a legislative and not a judicial
dispute.  It was a political, not a constitutional, argument that called for, and
won, a legislative and not an adjudicatory remedy.  Thus, on its face,
Madison’s argument—of which the “three pence” point was a part102—did not
call for any particular kind of adjudicatory stance toward religious establish-
ments.  Our argument then moves on to the deeper points about the substance
of Madison’s claims in the Memorial, in contrast to his views about religious
liberty in general and about the Federal Constitution in particular.  These show
that Madison was probably not invoking the “three pence” argument to
empower taxpayers in general, but rather to vindicate particular taxpayers
99 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-17, at 418 (observing that “the availability of citizen
standing must be analyzed with reference to the substantive right asserted”).
100 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.5, at 61-62.  At the same time, Professor Chemer-
insky notes that scholars have increasingly called for an abandonment of the doctrine. Id. at
62 n.16 (citing William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988)).
101 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
102 And, notwithstanding the phrase’s popularity as a separationist epigram—a tiny part, the
Memorial runs to fifteen meaty paragraphs.  The three pence line is one part of one sentence
of paragraph three. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 82.
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whose religious exercise was uniquely compromised by the Virginia scheme.
Furthermore, understanding the “three pence” argument as a literal call for
widespread adjudication by taxpayers would be out of character for Madison.
Madison was more inclined to rely on indirect structural mechanisms for pro-
tecting religious liberties than on judicially enforceable guarantees found in
bills of rights.  Finally, even if Madison’s “three pence” argument in Virginia
was championing religious liberty through taxpayer adjudication, his later argu-
ments in Philadelphia over the federal religion clauses portray a markedly dif-
ferent character and strategy.  Unlike the Madison of 1785 Virginia, the
Madison of 1790 Philadelphia sought modest, politically achievable guarantees
of religious liberty that would not have exacerbated national disagreements on
church-state matters.  The 1790 Madison would have a shunned a federal con-
stitutional remedy that risked entangling the federal courts in the delicate mat-
ter of religious taxpayer disputes.
The first and most obvious point is that Madison’s Memorial was not an
argument about judicial review at all.  Madison was addressing the Virginia
legislature about a matter up for popular determination.  The Memorial pleads
in the name of “[w]e the subscribers, citizens of the said Commonwealth.”103
The thrust of the argument is “that the General Assembly of this Common-
wealth” has “no authority to enact into law the Bill under consideration.”104
This is a political argument about popular legislation, not a legal argument
about adjudication.  As Professor Vincent Blasi explains, in the Memorial,
“Madison was not making a constitutional argument before a court of law; he
was appealing to the general public to bring pressure against a proposed piece
of legislation.”105  The question of judicial enforcement of statutes or constitu-
tions was not on the table, much less the finer points of adjudicating a federal
constitutional provision still six years in the future.
Thus, the fact that Madison included taxpayers’ interests in his catalogue
of objections to the General Assessment does not, of its own force, mean he
was claiming such interests should be vindicated by adjudication.  The idea of
taxpayers’ objections was an important device exploited by Madison, as we
will see below, but his audience was a legislative assembly and, logically, he
sought arguments couched to spur legislative action.  We should thus not
reflexively read Madison’s “three pence” argument as addressing whether tax-
payers (or anyone else) should be allowed to bring a lawsuit against the Assess-
ment.106  This obvious point is typically overlooked when arguing about the
significance of Madison’s Memorial to the federal religion clauses.  Institutions
and structures were every bit as, if not more, important to the framing genera-
103 Id.
104 Id. at 84.
105 Blasi, supra note 30, at 807.
106 This distinction would hold even if, when Madison was participating in drafting the
federal religion clauses six years later, he was thinking:  “That three pence argument I made
back in Virginia should apply to these new, federal religion clauses.”  Of course, Madison
said nothing of the kind during the debates on the Federal Constitution, as will be discussed
below.  But the point here is that, even if Madison had been silently rehearsing the three
pence argument in 1790 Philadelphia, that alone fails to show Madison was also thinking
about the requirements for judicial review of establishmentarian tax schemes.
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tion as the judicial enforcement of rights.107  One should not anachronistically
project onto Madison’s comments about taxpayers’ concerns our modern pre-
occupations with constitutional judicial review.
Another basic point concerns the responses to Madison’s Memorial.
When the General Assessment was defeated, the Virginia legislature ended up
passing Jefferson’s Act “for Establishing Religious Freedom.”108  The Act
stated explicitly that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical
. . . .”
109
 It enacted that “no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.”110  If one wanted to argue
that Madison’s “three pence” language sought, as a remedy, something akin to
general taxpayer standing to contest assessment-style taxes, then the language
of Jefferson’s Act furnishes a plausible textual hook by providing that “no man
shall be compelled . . . .”111  Other state constitutions of the period contained
similar language.112  Such provisions might plausibly support general taxpayer
standing by explicitly empowering anyone subject to the levies (or at least any-
one whose religious freedom was impacted by the levies) to contest them.  But
107 Madison himself argued in The Federalist that, given the “compound republic of
America,” in which power was divided between state and federal governments, and then
further divided at the federal level, “a double security arises to the rights of the people.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 270 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
2001).
108 See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 30, at 146.
109 ACT FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 84.
110 Id. at 85.
111 Id. (emphasis added).  This leaves aside the point, discussed below, whether the “com-
pulsion” to “furnish contributions of money” would impact every taxpayer, or rather only
those taxpayers who could claim their “free exercise” rights were peculiarly affronted by the
tax. See infra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.  The narrower point here is whether
the response to Madison’s three pence argument showed at least some textual intent to allow
someone to claim injury on the basis of the levy itself.
112 For instance, the Vermont Constitution of 1777 provided that “no man ought, or of right
can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect, or support any place of worship,
or maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of his conscience . . . .” VT. CONST. of
1777, ch. 1, § 3, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 75, 75 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). See also, DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMEN-
TAL RULES § 2 (1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 70, 70 (Philip B. Kur-
land & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (language similar to Vermont Constitution of 1777); N.J.
CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 71, 71 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (providing “nor shall any person, within this Colony,
ever be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or any other rates, for the purpose of building or repair-
ing any other church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any
minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right, or has deliberately or volunta-
rily engaged himself to perform.”).By the same token, state constitutions also knew how to
provide for the opposite—i.e., that contributions might be required by law to support minis-
ters.  The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided that:
[T[he legislature shall, from time to time, authorize and require, the several towns, precincts, and
other bodies-politic or religious societies to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for
the institution of the public worship of God and for the support and maintenance of public
Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality in all cases where such provision shall not be
made voluntarily.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 3, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 77, 77-78
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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no such language, of course, appears in the federal religion clauses.  Nor was
any such formulation proposed by any state.113  Even Madison’s own Virginia
failed to put forward such language.  Virginia’s proposal did lift passages ver-
batim from the Memorial, but not those addressing forced exactions of
money.114  Nor was such language ever proposed during the recorded debates
on the drafting of the religion clauses, by Madison or anyone else.115  Thus, if
one were looking for a plausible textual justification for general taxpayer stand-
ing (or, indeed, standing for any taxpayers), one might claim to find it in Jeffer-
son’s 1785 Act, but not in the federal religion clauses, whether in their
proposed or final formulations.  This does not mean that the idea of “compel-
ling” someone to “frequent or support” religious worship is irrelevant to the
substantive meaning of the federal religion clauses.  The point is only to draw
attention to the absence of the textual clues supporting the idea that taxpayers
are empowered to litigate those clauses as taxpayers.
Beyond these contextual points, consider what Madison was substantively
arguing in the Memorial, an argument in which the “three pence” idea figured
as only one part.  Simply put, with regard to taxpayers, Madison appears to
have been making what we would today call a “free exercise” claim, as
opposed to an “establishment” claim.  Madison was asserting that the General
Assessment violated the Virginia Declaration of Rights.116  As to religious lib-
erty, that 1776 Declaration provided that, since “religion, or the duty which we
owe to our CREATOR, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by
reason and conviction, not by force or violence . . . therefore, all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
113 See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT:
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 63-64 (2000) (discussing religious liberty provisions pro-
posed by state ratifying conventions).
114 With respect to religious liberty, the Virginia Ratifying Convention proposed a provision
exempting from military service “any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms . . .
upon payment of an equivalent[,]” as well as the following passage lifted in large part from
Madison’s Memorial, supra note 3, at 89, which in turn had quoted the 1776 Virginia Decla-
ration of Rights:
That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it can be
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men have an
equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of
conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by
Law in preference to others.
VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS (1788), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 89, 89 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter
VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION].
115 See WITTE, supra note 113, at 64-72 (explicating various formulations of the religion
clauses during the House committee debates).
116 As Professor Blasi explains, “[e]ight years earlier [in 1776] [Madison] had helped to
draft and steer to enactment the religious liberty clause of the new Virginia Constitution.
Madison viewed the General Assessment as a patent violation of that constitutional commit-
ment and a profound threat to Virginia’s experiment in republican government.”  Blasi,
supra note 30, at 784. See also CURRY, supra note 30, at 143 (“[The Memorial] declared
that the proposed bill violated the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the Declaration of
Rights . . . .”).
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conscience . . . .”117   Madison’s Memorial arguments converge around that
idea, and, in fact, Madison quoted that identical language at the very beginning
of the Memorial.118  Those attacking the 1785 Assessment, as Professor
Thomas Curry explains, considered the tax to violate the “free exercise” rights
enshrined in the 1776 Declaration—rights which the Assessment controversy
had enabled them to deepen and refine.119  Far less important, however, was
whether the Assessment constituted a religious “establishment.”  While both
proponents and opponents of the measure may have considered it to be some
novel form of an “establishment,” that was not the issue:  the principal ground
of dispute was over what we would identify today as “free exercise” values.
“Whether the assessment bill violated the Declaration of Rights,” Professor
Curry asserts, “not what kind of establishment it represented or even whether it
represented an establishment at all, proved to be the crux of the dispute.”120
Disputes over ministerial taxes in other states underscore the point.  Religious
dissenters, such as northeastern Baptists, commonly attacked ministerial taxes
as interfering with the free exercise of their religion.121  The interference
sprang from the fact that the assessments were earmarked for support of minis-
ters.122  Dissenters argued that this hampered religious exercise by tainting
what they believed was a sacred, voluntary relationship between pastor and
117 VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTI-
TUTION 70, 70 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
118 MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 82.
119 CURRY, supra note 30, at 146 (explaining that, “in the decade following the Declaration
of Independence, Virginians debated and clarified for themselves the meaning of the free
exercise of religion,” and that in the later Assessment controversy, “a majority of the people
construed the free exercise clause of the Declaration of Rights to mean that religion had to
be supported by voluntary means, and that state support of churches was incompatible with
religious liberty”) (emphasis added). See also Blasi, supra note 30, at 793 (explaining that
“[Madison’s] concern was that the clumsy effort to use religion to teach public virtue inter-
jected the civil mechanism of compulsory taxation into the relationship of voluntary support
that some denominations considered of the essence”). But see Bradley, supra note 96, at 39
(arguing that Madison’s “interpretation of section 16 [of the Declaration of Rights] was
certainly not the accepted one in Virginia”).
120 CURRY, supra note 30, at 148. See also id. at 191-192 (“Concerned primarily to show
that it did not violate the free exercise of religion, proponents of a general assessment
showed no consciousness of a need to develop such a distinction [i.e., between a ‘preferen-
tial’ and a ‘non-preferential’ establishment].”).  Along these lines, in a draft of his Bill
Exempting Dissenters from Contributing to the Support of the Church, Thomas Jefferson
wrote that dissenters “consider the Assessments and Contributions which they have been
hitherto obliged to make towards the support and Maintenance of the [Church of England]
and its Ministry as grievous and oppressive, and an Infringement of their religious Free-
dom.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, DRAFT OF BILL EXEMPTING DISSENTERS FROM CONTRIBUTING
TO THE SUPPORT OF THE CHURCH (1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 74,
74 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
121 See CURRY, supra note 30, at 172 (noting that “Massachusetts’s voluminous discourse
on Church-State matters during the revolutionary period focused almost entirely on the
meaning of freedom of religion” and that dissenters “generally did not raise the issue of an
establishment of religion”); see generally id. at 168-77 (detailing opposition by Massachu-
setts Baptists against ministerial taxes).
122 CURRY, supra note 30, at 137-39.
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congregation.123  As Professor Curry explains, “like their counterparts in other
states, [Massachusetts dissenters] opposed the system primarily as a violation
of religious freedom, rather than as an establishment of religion.”124
How does this historical context help determine whether the Memorial
supports, on its own terms, general taxpayer standing to adjudicate Establish-
ment Clause violations?  The Court’s crucial analytical move in Flast was to
paint Madison’s “three pence” argument as a broad-based mandate for “taxpay-
ers in general.”  But this rips Madison’s argument out of its context.  Madison
is better understood as championing those particular taxpayers who had a pre-
cise personal and theological complaint against the interference in their relig-
ious practice caused by the ministerial tax.  This reading harmonizes Madison’s
arguments with the general tenor of arguments in Virginia and elsewhere
against ministerial taxation schemes.  Madison’s “three pence” argument thus
vindicates a peculiar type of religious injury—specifically, an injury to free-
dom of association between ministers and congregation that is inflicted by the
operation of the assessment tax system.  What Madison does not do is lodge a
generalized complaint about the “religious” use of tax revenues.
Put in its proper historical context, then, Madison’s “three pence” argu-
ment looks more like a modern “free exercise” claim than a modern “establish-
ment” claim.  Modern Establishment Clause doctrine, as is well known,
agonizes over which kinds of taxation schemes amount to a forbidden estab-
lishment.125  But Free Exercise Clause doctrine has been comparatively clearer.
The imposition of a tax, by itself, rarely amounts to a free exercise violation.126
Even in the days of Sherbert balancing, the Supreme Court found, for instance,
that paying sales taxes on religious publications or paying social security taxes
did not even amount to the “significant burden” on religious exercise that
would trigger balancing.127
But what does this perspective mean for standing?  For standing purposes,
a free exercise argument based on taxation would demand the plaintiff be the
123 See, e.g., id. at 168 (explaining that Massachusetts Baptists “fundamentally disagreed
with Congregationalists on the narrow ground of organization and support of churches” and
that, among other things, “both church and minister should be supported voluntarily”); id. at
175 (explaining that “[t]o Baptists, who ‘owned that religion must at all times by a matter
between God and individuals,’ the very idea of state support—even impartial state support—
was by nature wrong and an imposition of the Congregational way of religion”); Bradley,
supra note 96, at 25 (explaining that, given the “Baptist disavowal of professional clergy”
that “they chose ministers from their own congregation to serve without compensation . . .
Baptists therefore did not need the system at all, and its burdens fell on them with no imme-
diate tangible benefit”); Blasi, supra note 30, at 806 (“A crucial source of [Madison’s] con-
cern was the claim by some denominations, especially the more evangelical Christian sects
such as the Baptists, that compulsory support of their clergy impaired the fundamental rela-
tionship that must obtain between preachers and their congregations.”).
124 CURRY, supra note 30, at 169.
125 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (addressing whether
allowing use of tax-derived voucher payments at religious schools violates the Establishment
Clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390 (1983) (addressing whether tax deductions for
religious education violate the Establishment Clause).
126 See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Ca., 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
127 Id.
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particular person whose religious exercise is burdened by the tax.  This would
rule out granting standing to any taxpayer qua taxpayer because of a genera-
lized complaint about the allegedly unconstitutional operation of the tax sys-
tem.  Consequently, when we translate Madison’s “three pence” argument into
modern doctrinal categories, it fails to support an exception to the ban on gen-
eralized taxpayer standing.  In other words, we should not read Madison’s
“three pence” rhetoric as literally calling on public authorities to track down
every religious penny.  Instead, the argument was Madison’s effective way of
dramatizing the harm to free exercise rights of those whose religious relation-
ships the assessment threatened to corrupt.
Another facet of Madison’s broader argument further contextualizes his
“three pence” language.  Professor Blasi points out that Madison’s objection to
the assessment hinges on the idea of the government taking “cognizance” of
religion.128  By this, Madison meant that the government wrongly assumed
“responsibility” or “jurisdiction” for religious matters.  For Madison the assess-
ment did just this by seeking to “stimulate religious belief” through tax-sup-
ported funding of ministers.129  It was not the amount of taxes, large or small,
that Madison was drawing attention to.  Rather, it was the violation of his
underlying view of church-state separation, a violation underwritten by those
tax funds.  As Professor Blasi explains, this is why
Madison, a realist in politics, could have insisted that the state cannot require a citi-
zen to “contribute three pence only of his property” to support a religious establish-
ment.  Surely he realized that some portion of a dissenter’s taxes pays for public
services, such as law enforcement and roads, that benefit churches no less than other
members of the community.  What coerced taxes, no matter how small, could not
support, in Madison’s view, was a religious “establishment,” by which he meant any
instance of government taking “cognizance” of, that is responsibility for, religion.
Madison’s concept of separation could be severe, but it was a separation of functions
and purposes, not some quixotic attempt to achieve a hermetically sealed spatial
separation.130
On this view, the modern reading of Madison’s “three pence” argument—
the one Flast depends on—confuses the “three pence” of taxes for the relig-
ious establishment itself.  But to Madison, the central flaw in the assessment
scheme was the cooperative relationship set up between government and cer-
tain Christian churches.131  The “government cognizance” angle thus illumi-
nates Madison’s “three pence” argument just as the free exercise angle did.
Madison was not seeking to empower private attorneys general to demand
every religiously-tinged penny back from government coffers.  Instead, he was
drawing attention to what he believed was a dangerous structural union
between government and churches.132  A taxpayer standing argument based on
the “three pence” language misses Madison’s actual target.
128 Blasi, supra note 30, at 789-91. See, e.g., MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 82 (“We main-
tain therefore that in matters of Religion, no mans [sic] right is abridged by the institution of
Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”).
129 Blasi, supra note 30, at 790.
130 Id. at 791.
131 See, e.g., MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 82-83, ¶ 4.
132 Professor Kmiec makes this point well in a recent essay on Hein.  Kmiec writes that
Madison’s “famous Remonstrance challenged the coercive taking of even ‘three pence’ not
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In sum, reconstructing Madison’s argument along free exercise or struc-
tural lines clarifies the function of his “three pence” rhetoric.  Specifically
earmarked taxes were underwriting the  scheme he wanted the legislature to
oppose, and that useful fact allowed Madison to make his powerful point:
extracting the tiniest trickle of tax funds today to fund this establishment would
be precedent for forcing you to give up larger amounts tomorrow to fund future
establishments.133  Essentially, Madison’s is the same argument that politicians
make today (less artfully, of course) when they criticize a government program
on the basis that “Your tax dollars are being used to fund [insert politically
unpopular project].”  That may or may not be an effective argument, but it is
unmistakably political; no one thinks the politician is making a legal point
about standing to sue.  Madison wasn’t, either.
Consequently, Madison’s “three pence” argument, properly understood on
its own terms, provides no foundation for a modern exception to the ban on
taxpayer standing.  This alone is a crippling blow to Flast.  It means that, even
if we hypothesize that Madison exported his “three pence” argument from 1785
Virginia to 1790 Philadelphia (a proposition for which, as discussed below,
there is no evidence), he was not exporting the particular idea of widespread
taxpayer adjudication on religion clause matters.  But what if we reverse mat-
ters?  Let us assume that Madison’s “three pence” argument was, in fact, a plea
for something like standing for taxpayers generally to contest taxes based on
religious objections.  That does not solve the Flast problem, however, because
we would then have to show that Madison successfully embedded that idea
about constitutional adjudication in the federal religion clauses.  But whatever
the evidence shows about Madison’s personal influence on the substance of the
federal clauses, it fails to show Madison making any equivalent of our hypothe-
sized “three pence” argument during the ratification debates.
When Madison changed his role as Virginia legislator in 1785, for the role
of federal constitutional advocate in 1788, his arguments did not sound like
someone who was holding up adjudication as the key to protecting religious
liberty—much less adjudication employing general taxpayer standing.  Instead,
Madison explicitly downplayed the role of bills of rights in protecting religious
liberty.  This appears most clearly in Madison’s 1788 remarks to the Virginia
Ratifying Convention.  There, in support of the proposed Constitution, Madison
mocked the notion that a bill of rights would act as a “security for religion”:
for the otherwise disinterested taxpayer ‘upset’ by the inclusion of faith groups in a general
program, but for the compelled support of an established church and coerced ‘conformity’
thereto.  That is a substantial difference.”  Kmiec, supra note 49, at 513.
133 This is, not to put too fine a point on it, precisely what Madison wrote in the Memorial:
“Who does not see . . . that the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three
pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to con-
form to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?” MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 82.
The “three pence” here was not the “establishment” itself, but rather a seemingly innocuous
and minimal burden that a taxpayer might not notice and therefore not object to.  Madison
was arguing, in effect, “You should object to the establishment underwritten by the Assess-
ment, even though you might not notice the burden.”  He was not arguing, “The three pence,
in and of themselves, are the establishment.”  Professor Blasi makes a similar point. See
Blasi, supra note 30, at 791 & n.34.
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Would the bill of rights, in this state, exempt the people from paying for the support
of one particular sect, if such sect were exclusively established by law?  If there were
a majority of one sect, a bill of rights would be a poor protection for liberty.134
Notice that the specific example Madison used:  an assessment, or “paying
for the support of one particular sect.”  Madison instead argued that the “utmost
freedom of religion . . . arises from that multiplicity of sects, which pervades
America, and which is the best and only security for religious liberty in any
society.”135  This mirrors Madison’s arguments in The Federalist that the best
protection for individual rights lies in the checking function of a thriving vari-
ety of factions, including religious factions.  This was Madison’s famous
“republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government”:
the “variety of [religious] sects dispersed over the entire face of [the confeder-
acy], must secure the national councils against any danger from that source.”136
Madison contrasted this method of controlling factious majorities—which he
said was “exemplified” in the Constitution—with the method of “creating a
will in the community independent of the majority,” which by implication
Madison must have thought alien to the new constitutional system.137
Thus, as advocate for the new Constitution, Madison downplayed judicial
review of specific constitutional guarantees as a means of protecting religious
liberty.  But this is unsurprising given “Madison’s penchant for thinking about
issues of liberty and legitimacy in structural terms.”138  Professor Blasi eluci-
dates this aspect of Madison’s approach to protecting religious freedom:
[Madison] had little faith in legalistic guarantees—‘parchment barriers’ he dismis-
sively called them.  Instead, he focused on such matters as institutional incentives,
checks and balances, object lessons from the past, and scenarios of decay and
abuse. . . . He sought to forestall and contain abuses of power be means of perspica-
cious institutional design.  His approach to the subject of church and state was in this
spirit.139
None of this suggests that Madison was pressing broad-gauged adjudica-
tion and judicial review as the bulwark of religious liberty in the Federal Con-
stitution.140  It does not matter that today we prefer such means.  But it does
matter that the Flast Court uncritically drafted Madison as the spokesman for
an exceptionally broad form of such a remedy, and pressed his “three pence”
argument into service as its ur-text.
134 VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION, supra note 114, at 88.
135 Id.
136 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48  (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (setting out general theory of
checking function of numerous factions in an extended republic).
137 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 270 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001).
138 Blasi, supra note 30, at 788.
139 Id. at 788-89.
140 As Professor Steven Smith points out, the “pluralism” Madison evidenced in Federalist
10 and 51 and at the Virginia Ratifying Convention militates strongly against the Madison of
the Memorial, assiduously protecting taxpayers’ consciences against “three pence” of
improper taxation. STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY:  A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 10-26 (2001).
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When in 1790 Madison again changed hats, and proposed amendments to
the Constitution in the First Congress, his overall strategy and recorded com-
ments during the debates further undermine the notion that he was pressing an
aggressive version of his “three pence” argument (as understood here only
arguendo) at the national level.  At that point, Madison willingly suspended his
private views of church-state relationships in favor of more politically expedi-
ent measures that would command broad support.  Madison would likely have
supported far-reaching alterations in church-state relationships at the federal
and state level, but, as Professor Thomas Curry observes, “[r]epeatedly, in his
correspondence, as well as in his speeches, [Madison] asserted that he sought
achievable amendments that would eschew controversy and gain ratification
. . . .”
141
 According to Professor Gerard Bradley, “[t]he truth is that Madison’s
personal philosophy, whatever it may have been, has nothing to do with the
meaning of the Establishment Clause.”142  In the House debate, Madison mini-
mized the substance of, and even the necessity for, the religion clauses.143
Even more revealing was Madison’s response to Representative Benjamin
Huntington of Connecticut during the debate.  Representative Huntington
feared that a broad interpretation of the religion clauses would grant a federal
court jurisdiction to interfere in New England states’ enforcement of compul-
sory support for ministers’ salaries.  But Madison assured him it would not.144
Representative Huntington, as Professor Bradley explains, “was asking
Madison whether the New England system, much more coercive than even the
general assessment opposed by Madison in 1785, might be an establish-
ment.”145  Madison “alleviated this fear, clearly indicating that there was no
conflict.”146  Admittedly, Madison’s somewhat cryptic response might be inter-
preted along federalism lines:  the religion clauses would have had nothing to
do with New England states’ arrangements, and federal courts would not have
likely had jurisdiction to meddle in them.  But Madison’s response shows he
was talking about more than federalism—he was in fact addressing the sub-
stance of what he thought the Establishment Clause outlawed.  Madison pro-
posed that the word “national” be inserted before “religion,” since, as Madison
explained,
He believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two
combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to
conform.147
141 CURRY, supra note 30, at 205.
142 BRADLEY, supra note 96, at 87.
143 In the debate, Madison commented that “[w]hether the words [of the religion clauses]
are necessary or not, he did not mean to say, but they had been required by some of the State
Conventions,” who feared the implications of Congress’ Necessary and Proper powers.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1789), reprinted in 5
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 92, 93 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
144 WITTE, supra note 113, at 66-67.  Professor Bradley adds that, in Everson, Justice Rut-
ledge’s dissent got this exchange exactly backwards, understanding Madison to be saying
that the compulsory clergy tax was in fact an “establishment of religion.” See BRADLEY,
supra note 96, at 91.
145 BRADLEY, supra note 96, at 91.
146 Id.
147 WITTE, supra note 113, at 67.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ103.txt unknown Seq: 26  3-MAR-09 14:47
Fall 2008] MISUNDERSTANDING FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 57
In other words, Madison reassured Representative Huntington not merely
because of the federalism aspects of the religion clauses, but also because the
New England arrangement would not come within the purview of the substan-
tive anti-establishment prohibition in the religion clauses.
The implications for the “three pence” question are evident.  Had Madison
intended to import his three pence idea into the Establishment Clause, his
response to Representative Huntington would have been completely different.
After all, the scheme Representative Huntington was concerned to protect was
“much more coercive” than the 1785 Assessment Madison had defeated in Vir-
ginia.148  But in response to Representative Huntington, Madison seemed to
shrug—the federal clauses, he said in effect, have nothing to do with such mat-
ters, whether precisely because of their federal character, or because the anti-
establishment prohibition would not be triggered by the New England taxation
scheme.  If matters stood otherwise, merely proposing the religion clauses
would have immensely complicated the cause of the new Constitution.  At the
time, opinions diverged sharply in the states about whether religion should be
supported by taxation.  People even disagreed over whether mandatory assess-
ments really amounted to full-blown “establishments” at all.149  It would have
been a particularly inauspicious time, then, for Madison to import his three
pence idea (understood in its more aggressive sense) into the federal religion
clauses.150  A politician of Madison’s skill would have been urging a federal
constitutional right empowering every single taxpayer in the country to contest
federal taxation schemes based on whether they amounted to an “establishment
of religion.”  True, Madison knew how to introduce novel measures into the
Constitution.  He had unsuccessfully proposed an amendment binding the states
themselves to respect freedom of conscience.151  So one cannot rule out the
possibility that he might have sought to include an aggressive anti-taxation
right as part of the Federal Constitution.  But the important point is that
Madison’s recorded comments during the drafting of the religion clauses
betrayed the opposite intention.  He was seeking to build consensus for the new
Constitution, and to placate the fears of those who were attached to church-
state relationships that Madison himself deplored.  Madison the Virginia legis-
lator was willing to fight for political goals at the state level that Madison the
constitutional advocate sought to avoid at the federal level.  Even if the Vir-
ginia legislator had been advocating for the modern equivalent of general tax-
payer standing for anti-establishment claims (which is doubtful, as seen), the
notion that the constitutional advocate was pushing such goals beggars belief.
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS:  THE HISTORY OF A BAD INVESTMENT
All that remains to be said for the merits of Flast’s taxpayer standing
doctrine is:  the thing is bankrupt.  In forty years, no interest has accrued on the
Court’s original “three pence” investment, even though picked from James
Madison’s pocket.  But this should come as no surprise.  No scholar has made a
148 BRADLEY, supra note 96, at 91.
149 See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 30, at 219-20.
150 See, e.g., id.  at 205; BRADLEY, supra note 96, at 88-89.
151 See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 113, at 65-66.
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sustained attempt to spruce up the Court’s historical justification,152 although
scholars commonly assert that some form of taxpayer standing is necessary to
vindicate the Establishment Clause.153  Perhaps the standing inquiry is in fact
inextricable from the underlying merits, and any attempt to separate the two
ends in incoherence.154  Perhaps the Court was wrong in the first place to make
an Article III “case or controversy” depend on the existence of a personal
152 For instance, although criticizing Flast’s standing analysis, Professor Steven Winter
seems to accept the Court’s historical assertions about the Establishment Clause at face
value.  He notes that “Ms. Flast was arguing that the establishment clause protected her from
a society in which tax monies would be used for impermissible, religious purposes,” and that
“[i]n support of this point, the majority invoked the legislative history of the establishment
clause . . . .”  Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Govern-
ance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1467 & n.543 (1988) (emphasis added).  Immediately thereaf-
ter, he correctly notes that the Court’s actual support for its holding was Madison’s three
pence language, which, as this article and many other commentators have explained, forms
no part of the “legislative history” of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1467 & n.544.  In the
same vein, Professor William Fletcher agrees with Flast (and would in fact extend it) on the
basis that “the protection provided by the establishment clause cannot be fully realized
unless there is easy and unrestricted access to the courts to challenge federal expenditures or
grants that might violate the clause.”  Fletcher, supra note 100, at 269.  He does not attempt
to support that conclusion, however, with any evidence beyond the Court’s own “historical
argument that the clause was enacted to prevent the forced exaction of moneys for the sup-
port of state-sponsored religion.” See id.  Professor Carl Esbeck argues that the existence of
Flast standing shows that the Establishment Clause is properly understood as a structural
restraint on government power, rather than as a guarantee of individual rights. See, e.g., Carl
H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84
IOWA L. REV. 1, 33-40 (1998).  It is more than plausible to see the Clause as principally
structural.  But that is not a reason in and of itself to require general taxpayer standing to
enforce the Clause (nor does Professor Esbeck seem to be making that point).
153 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.5.5, at 94-95 (criticizing the Court’s failure in
Valley Forge to extend Flast to Congress’s disposition of property under Article IV); TRIBE,
supra note 9, § 3-17, at 423-24 (same); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON
READING THE CONSTITUTION 91-92 (1991) (arguing that “a taxpayer may suffer more
through the unconstitutional disposition of property . . . than through a budgetary expendi-
ture . . . .”).  For instance, in criticizing the same decision, Professor David Dow argues that
the majority opinion “simply paid no heed to the nature of the establishment clause,”
because “[h]ad the right at issue been analyzed, it would have been clear that whenever the
clause is violated, the resulting injury is necessarily widely shared.”  David R. Dow, Stand-
ing and Rights, 36 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1208 (1987).  But in support of those propositions
about the “nature of the establishment clause” and the “right” at issue in the case, Professor
Dow cites only Justice Brennan’s Valley Forge dissent. Id. at 1208 n.40.  Justice Brennan’s
dissent, while lengthy, merely reiterates Flast’s historical rationale for allowing generalized
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 499-510 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
154 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.5.1, at 62 (arguing that “[u]ltimately, the law
of standing turns on basic normative questions about which there is no consensus”).  Profes-
sor Chemerinsky here quotes Professor Fletcher for the proposition that the standing inquiry
“should be seen as a question of substantive law, answerable by reference to the statutory or
constitutional provision whose protection is invoked.” Id. at 62 n.16 (quoting Fletcher,
supra note 100, at 229). See also TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-15, at 399 (noting that “the
question of what it means to be ‘injured’ itself entails a complex and value-laden
judgment”).
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injury.155  Such profound questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
Instead, the point here has been to explore the question raised but left unan-
swered in Hein:  whether the taxpayer standing exception created by Flast
stands on its own historical merits.  The answer is no.  This concluding Section
briefly places that failure in the larger context of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
Dramatic fallacies of historiography are nothing new in this area.  The
modern Establishment Clause project itself is based, say many scholars, on a
misunderstanding of the function the Clause was meant to perform in our con-
stitutional structure.156  On that view, the Clause originally served to quarantine
church-state issues at the state level, preventing such irresolvable questions
from exploding onto the national scene.  Such a jurisdictional provision did not,
and could not, embody any grandiose “theory” of substantive church-state rela-
tionships useful for adjudicating particular controversies.  To the extent that
view is correct, what the Supreme Court did in 1947 by applying the Clause to
the States was, as Professor Steven Smith argues, effectively to repeal it.157  To
the extent this jurisdictional thesis is wrong, many still admit that the Supreme
Court’s understanding of the Clause’s history was grievously flawed.158  Here,
155 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions:  Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 840 (1969) (concluding “the notion that the constitution
demands injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite to attacks on allegedly unconstitu-
tional action is historically unfounded”). See also TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-15, at 393
(observing that “[h]istorically, whether members of the public who had not suffered concrete
or particularized injury could sue turned on whether substantive law . . . conferred a cause of
action on them, not on any inquiry into ‘injury in fact’”); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1479 & n.229 (1988) (noting
originalist doubts about personal injury requirement for Article III “case or controversy”).
156 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1157-58 (1991); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment:  Congress, Sec-
tion 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1557-63 (1995)
(discussing the historical debates as evidence of the original intent of the Framers); William
K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause:  Federalism and the Rollback of Incor-
poration, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1206-11 (1990) (discussing incorporation and the Estab-
lishment Clause); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19,
22-23 & nn.15-16 (2006) (noting that “a number of commentators have similarly argued that
the Establishment Clause should never have been applied to the states, or that courts should
apply a relaxed version of the religion clauses to government beneath the federal level”)
(citing STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE:  THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995) [hereinafter SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE]);
Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004)); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Estab-
lishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1703 n.25 (1992).  For my
take on this issue, see Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the U.S.
Constitution, 52 VILL. L. REV. 67 (2007).
157 See generally SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 156, at 17-34 (summarizing
the case for a jurisdictional understanding of the Establishment Clause).
158 See, e.g., id. at 4-5 (noting scholars who have disputed the Court’s reading of Establish-
ment Clause history) (citing Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise,
90 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1991); BRADLEY, supra note 96; ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE:  HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); MARK DEWOLFE
HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS:  RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965)).
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for instance, are the instructive comments in a recent essay by Professor Carl
Esbeck, a prominent religion clause scholar:
The Everson Court did indulged [sic] the wildly improbable assertion that the
Virginia experience of 1784-86 was bootlegged by James Madison and Thomas Jef-
ferson into the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as it was being drafted
by the First Congress meeting in New York City during the period June to September
1789.  The drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights entailed a mostly different
cast of participants and an entirely new array of concerns.  We have a sketchy but
still informative record of the debate in both the House and Senate of the First Con-
gress over the drafting and redrafting of the text that eventually became the Estab-
lishment Clause.  There is no indication that the Virginia experience of a few years
before was even mentioned during these debates or was otherwise a factor.  While
Madison was in the middle of things, Jefferson was in Paris serving as our ambassa-
dor to France.159
Given that state of affairs, Flast’s own historical flaws—flaws that con-
cern the same historical materials—are par for the course.
But Flast’s failings raise the stakes of bad history.  Standing is supposed
to be, at least in some sense, distinct from the merits, and to serve distinct
values such as separation of powers, judicial efficiency, and judicial compe-
tency.160  It would seem anomalous, then, to make standing turn on highly con-
tested questions about the merits of the provision sought to be enforced.161  But
Flast did just that:  its standing exception subsumes a host of murky questions
about Establishment Clause doctrine and history.  Consequently, Flast undercut
whatever salutary restraining role that standing doctrine could play in constitu-
tional adjudication of the Establishment Clause, with predictable effects on the
coherence of the resulting jurisprudence.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has generated many controversial,
persistent, and seemingly intractable questions.162  The area of public funding
159 Carl H. Esbeck, The 60th Anniversary of the Everson Decision and America’s Church-
State Proposition, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 15, 27 n.40 (2007) (citations omitted).  For further
criticism of the Supreme Court’s use of historical materials in Establishment Clause cases,
see Symposium, The (Re)turn to History in Religion Clause Law and Scholarship, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1697 (2006) (featuring articles by Steven K. Green, Marci A. Hamilton &
Rachel Steamer, Douglas Laycock, and Steven D. Smith).
160 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.5.1, at 61-62 (discussing values served by
standing, such as separation of powers, judicial efficiency, judicial reputation, judicial com-
petency, and fairness); TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-14, at 388-91 (discussing Court’s more
recent emphasis on the separation-of-powers function of standing doctrines) (citing, inter
alia, Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983)).
161 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, § 3-14, at 390 (observing that “[c]ritics have charged the
Supreme Court with habitually manipulating settled standing rules to pursue extraneous,
often unacknowledged ends—such as advancing the majority’s view of the merits, resolving
problems associated with broad equitable relief, and serving federalism values”).
162 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (assert-
ing that “in the 38 years since Everson our Establishment Clause cases have been neither
principled nor unified,” and describing the disarray at length); see also Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality & the Constitution:  An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 315 (1986) (asserting that “[f]or nearly
four decades the Supreme Court has meandered through the province of church-state rela-
tions, leaving behind a serpentine trail of constitutionality”) (footnote omitted).
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alone has its own zip code.  What is the relationship between the Establishment
Clause and government taxing-and-spending?  May the government spend tax
money for “religious” purposes?  May public funds end up in the pockets of
churches, synagogues, pastors, rabbis, or other religious associations and per-
sons?  Does it matter what path the funds take?  May an evenhanded public
welfare program fund religious organizations directly?  May it do so indirectly,
through private choices?  May it provide in-kind aid to such organizations
directly?  Indirectly?163
But a prior question, rarely asked, is whether such dilemmas are even sus-
ceptible to judicial resolution.  Perhaps some of them are sensibly left to the
political process because the Constitution furnishes no reliable standards for
adjudicating them.  Standing doctrine could help sort out such matters by limit-
ing judicial resolution to cases in which plaintiffs alleged a concrete and per-
sonal injury.  Thus, the courts would adjudicate only those Establishment
Clause taxing-and-spending issues that impacted individual rights according to
that traditional measure.  Courts, then, could enforce the Establishment Clause
just as far as any other constitutional protection—that is, to the extent that
standing, and other justiciability doctrines, indicate that judicial enforcement is
appropriate and effective.
But, whatever the proper restraints on Establishment Clause adjudication
might be, Flast swept those concerns under the rug through historical sleight-
of-hand.  Prior to any merits question, Flast deputized every taxpayer to litigate
taxing-and-spending issues based on the sole, undefended premise that every
taxpayer must, by definition, have a litigable Establishment Clause interest.
This is the case no matter how small the amount of the tax, no matter how or
why the tax was levied, and no matter how or why the money was spent.  With-
out saying so, then, Flast purported to resolve without argument profound dis-
putes about the scope of the Establishment Clause, about what sorts of “rights”
or “interests” the Clause protects, and about the proper use of historical materi-
als to answer such questions.164
The Court deployed these sub silentio decisions to create a standing
exception unheard of, and explicitly rejected, in every other area of law.  And,
as we have seen, the Court’s sole support was a single phrase from a historical
document with no relevance to the question.  In its recent Hein decision, the
Court did little to remedy this anomaly, but at least the case raised the question
again after a long interlude.  Perhaps Hein’s real significance will become evi-
dent only in a future case, when a majority of the Court finally takes a fresh and
honest look at the strange doctrine created in Flast.165  The Court could then
163 See generally DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  THE RELIGION CLAUSES 172-
201 (2003) (explaining the Court’s public aid jurisprudence).
164 Cf., e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in
Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2288 (1998) (arguing that, while “a coherent
concept of standing grows out of a clear definition of the relevant injury,” in voting rights
cases, “the Supreme Court has failed to articulate any theory of injury that coherently
accounts for the standing rule it has produced”).
165 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 1-
2 (2007) (noting that “Hein may be the harbinger of further restrictions on standing in other
types of Establishment Clause cases, such as cases involving government endorsement of
sectarian religious principles and symbols.”); Kmiec, supra note 49, at 514 (arguing that
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rectify yet another instance of shoddy law office history in Establishment
Clause cases.  Those are my two cents’ worth, anyway.
“[t]he primary benefit of the modest decision in Hein is that it gives the Roberts Court an
opportunity to re-think the underlying religion-clause jurisprudence more carefully”).
